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ADDING TEETH TO UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONFORMITY
ACT OF 1993
Michael H. Posner* and Peter J. Spiro**
United States ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in June of 19921 marked a milestone in this
country's long history as a guardian of human rights. The Covenant
has been hailed as one of the most important international instru-
ments of our generation, a modern Magna Carta for more than one
hundred nations that have acceded to it. Ratification of the Cove-
nant allows the United States to participate more actively in the
development and monitoring of international human rights stan-
dards throughout the world. At a time when democracy and demo-
cratic ideals enjoy an unprecedented primacy, the United States' re-
newed commitment to the international protection of human rights
will help to ensure that important democratic principles and values
take hold in the infant democracies of Eastern Europe,. the former
Soviet Union, and elsewhere.
However, U.S. ratification of the Covenant was conditioned by
the attachment of reservations, declarations, and understandings
that confine its domestic effect to the existing requirements of U.S.
law. In its report on the Covenant, the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations recognized the need to consider changes in U.S. law
towards the goal of more complete conformity with the treaty's
mandate.' The report recommended, however, that these changes
* Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
* International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; Resident Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. The authors are grateful for the substantial assistance of
Christopher R. Nicastro, J.D., University of Michigan, 1992.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see also SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 25 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992); 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008-09 (June
5, 1992).
2. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Committee on
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would best be pursued through "the normal legislative process," as a
more appropriate means of bringing the United States into full com-
pliance at the international level. 3
The draft International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993
(draft Act) 4 responds to this call for legislative action. It addresses
several substantive deviations from the requirements of the Cove-
nant arising from conditions attached to U.S. ratification. In partic-
ular, the draft Act conforms U.S. law to requirements of the Cove-
nant in the following areas: the execution of juvenile offenders and
pregnant women; standards of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment; retroactive imposition of lighter criminal pen-
alties; compensation for unlawful arrests and convictions resulting
from the miscarriage of justice; successive prosecutions by federal
and state authorities; and the segregation of juvenile from adult of-
fenders and of the convicted from the accused.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of its path to ratification
by the United States. Substantive provisions of the draft Interna-
tional Human Rights Conformity Act are explained in Part II. Part
III discusses dual sources of congressional authority to enact this
bill, pursuant to its powers both to "define and punish . . . offenses
against the law of nations"8 and "to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion," the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The draft Act is the product of the combined efforts of a broad
coalition of domestic civil and human rights organizations. Uniting
these diverse organizations is an overriding interest in the develop-
ment and protection of human rights both in the United States and
abroad, to which end the United States should provide unstinting
and unqualified international leadership. Strict U.S. adherence to
the same high standards to which it holds other nations will enhance
its ability to shape and protect standards of human rights on a
global basis.
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) [hereinafter 1991
Human Rights Hearing]; SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 25, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. at 660.
3. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 25, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660.
4. See app., infra, at 1228.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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I. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was
born of the aftermath of World War II. Inspired in part by Presi-
dent Roosevelt's call for the establishment of the "Four Freedoms"
throughout the world," the Allies imposed human rights obligations
on the conquered Axis powers. These obligations included execution
of a charter for the United Nations that placed a special emphasis
on "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all," the achievement of which end member
States must pledge to undertake.'
Recognizing that the Charter's general statement on human
rights required more specific action, member states, as led by the
United States, moved to conclude the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,9 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,1" and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights11 - collectively known as the International Bill of
Human Rights."2 All three documents, but particularly the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, draw heavily on our own Bill of
Rights and the United States' long tradition of protecting individual
human rights. As a result, the Covenant is almost entirely consistent
with the U.S. Constitution, protecting many of the same rights.
Among the specific rights enumerated in the Covenant are freedom
of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; the right of peaceful assembly; the right to vote; equal protec-
tion of the law; the right to liberty and security of the person, in-
cluding protection against arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to
a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence; the right of pri-
vacy; freedom of movement, residence, and emigration; freedom
7. See Annual Message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the United States Congress,
reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 26-41 (1940-41); Louis Sohn, United
States Attitudes Toward Ratification of Human Rights Instruments, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
255, 256-58 (1990).
8. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
9. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
10. ICCPR, supra note 1.
11. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
12. For background on the genesis of the covenants, see Louis Henkin, Introduction to INTER-
NATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS I (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981); Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 32.
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from slavery and forced labor; and the general right to protection of
life, including protection against the arbitrary deprivation of life.
At least 115 nations have become party to the Covenant since it
was first opened for signature in 1966.13 Today, human rights are no
longer governed exclusively by national law; the Covenant, along
with a host of other more recent international accords adopted in its
wake, carves out a series of inalienable human rights protected
under the law of nations. What once was a matter of domestic juris-
diction is now the subject of daily diplomacy and international rela-
tions. Regional human rights treaties, international human rights
tribunals, and nongovernmental human rights organizations have
multiplied over the last twenty years, supplementing - and some-
times supplanting - domestic law and legal institutions. The Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights itself provides for the considera-
tion of specific human rights abuses, subsequent to the exhaustion of
domestic remedies, by the Human Rights Committee, a body of
eighteen experts who meet to review compliance by State Parties
under United Nations auspices. 4 As Professor Louis Henkin re-
cently observed, "[t]he universalization of human rights is a politi-
cal fact."' 5
President Carter signed the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1977 and sent it to the Senate for its consent to
ratification in 1978.11 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on the Covenant and three other humans rights treaties in
1979."1 At the urging of President Bush, the Committee renewed its
consideration of the Covenant with hearings in 199118 and subse-
quently referred the treaty to the full Senate for formal approval.'
On April 2, 1992, the Senate granted its consent to the Covenant,2 0
subject to a series of reservations and understandings implicating
many of the Covenant's most important provisions and qualifying
13. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Status as of 1991, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER. E/10 & 1993 supp. at 133-34 (listing actions by State Parties to the Covenant
through Jan. 14, 1993)
14. See ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 28-45, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179-84.
15. Henkin, supra note 12, at 1.
16. Message from the President to the Senate Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human
Rights, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978).
17. See International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
18. 1991 Human Rights Hearing, supra note 2.
19. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 25, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660.
20. 138 CONG. REC. 54783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
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every respect in which adherence to the Covenant would otherwise
alter existing U.S. practice.21 President Bush accomplished delivery
of the instruments of ratification in June.22
During the 1991 hearings and in the Committee Report itself,
several references were made to the possibility of enacting legisla-
tion to address the substance of these conditions through the "cus-
tomary legislative process."2 3 As a matter of constitutional law,
changes in U.S. law could have been directly effected by uncondi-
tional U.S. assent to the Covenant.24 As noted during Senate consid-
eration of the Covenant, however, unlike modifications of U.S. law
made by treaty, a traditional legislative initiative requires the par-
ticipation of the House of Representatives.2 5 Inclusion of the House
of Representatives will reflect the importance that the United States
places on legislation affecting our civil and political rights and will
highlight broadly based domestic support for the protection of
human rights both nationally and globally.
Allowed to stand, the conditions attached to ratification would
leave significant disparities between U.S. and international law.
These disparities could lead other parties to question the sincerity of
our commitment to the Covenant and our willingness to submit to
the same international standards we urge on others. Uncorrected
derogation thus may prompt serious and continuing international
opprobrium at the same time as it undermines our standing as a
longstanding champion of human rights and deprives Americans of
protections guaranteed to citizens of many other nations. The draft
21. Id. at S4783-84.
22. 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (June 5, 1992).
23. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
650 ("(lt may be appropriate and necessary to question whether changes in U.S. law should be
made to bring the United States into full compliance at the international level . . . the Committee
anticipates that changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur through the normal legislative pro-
cess."); see also 1991 Human Rights Hearing, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Richard Schifter,
Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs); id. at 80 (administra-
tion reply to questions submitted by Sen. Helms) ("Congress remains free, of course, to adopt
legislation conforming U.S. law to the requirements of the Covenant through the customary legis-
lative process."). Even in the absence of such corrective legislation, ratification of the Covenant
may have concrete, albeit marginal, impact on U.S. law. See John Quigley, Criminal Law and
Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59 (1993).
24. Because imposition of Covenant requirements on the states would not implicate any specific
constitutional prohibitions, federalism concerns would prove no bar to the preemption of state law
by treaty. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302 cmt. d (1987).
25. See 1991 Human Rights Hearing, supra note 2, at 15.
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Act would reaffirm our commitment to universal human rights
through the accomplishment of more substantial U.S. compliance
with the Covenant.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONFORMITY ACT OF
1993
The draft International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993 is
offered as a means of conforming U.S. human rights law, through
the traditional legislative process, to international standards as de-
fined by the Covenant. The Act does not address every area in
which U.S. law conflicts with international norms on human rights.
Rather, it modestly attempts to address only the most important re-
spects in which U.S. reservations to the Covenant will otherwise en-
trench disparities between U.S. law and that of other parties to the
accord. In particular, the draft Act would: 1) prohibit the execution
of juvenile offenders and pregnant women; 2) make it unlawful to
subject individuals to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment as defined by international law; 3) require the retroac-
tive imposition of legislative reductions in criminal penalties; 4) pro-
vide a federal right to compensation for unlawful arrests and convic-
tions resulting from the miscarriage of justice; 5) prohibit the
prosecution of individuals by federal or state authorities when an
individual has already been either finally convicted or acquitted for
the same acts or transaction; and 6) require segregation of juveniles
offenders from adult prisoners and of the accused from the con-
victed.26 The following is a section-by-section discussion of the sub-
stantive provisions of the draft Act.
A. Execution of Juvenile Offenders
Section 103 of the draft Act prohibits the execution of any indi-
26. The draft Conformity Act would leave standing only one significant condition attached to
ratification of the Covenant. Article 20 of the Covenant requires that "propaganda for war" and
"advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence" shall be prohibited by law. The first reservation to U.S. ratification provides
that "Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that
would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of
the United States." SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 11, reprinted in 31
I.LM. at 653. Because full adherence to the Covenant would in this respect represent a restriction
of existing domestic rights, the reservation is appropriate and should not be countermanded. See
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (holding that a treaty may not override specific constitutional
prohibitions); Louis Henkin, Constitutional and Human Rights, 13 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 593,
626 (1978).
[Vol. 42:12091214
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vidual for a crime or crimes committed while under the age of eigh-
teen, implementing Article 6(5) of the Covenant and reversing the
effect of the second reservation to U.S. ratification. Under existing
Supreme Court precedent, criminal offenders may be executed for
crimes committed at the age of 16 or older. 27 Twenty-four states
currently permit the execution of such offenders, leaving the United
States as one of only a handful of countries (including Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Rwanda, and Barbados) that continues to tolerate this
practice.2" No other Party to the Covenant has failed to accept this
proscription, which is also found in Article 4(5) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 29 Article 68 of the Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 0
Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,31
and Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man.3 2 Reflecting the clear command of the Covenant and these
other international accords, the bill would prohibit the execution of
juvenile offenders as a matter of U.S. law.
B. Execution of Pregnant Women
Section 104 prohibits the execution of pregnant women. Although
the Senate's ratification of the Covenant did not include a reserva-
tion from the Covenant's prohibition of the execution of pregnant
women, sixteen states in this country still have laws governing capi-
tal punishment which would permit such executions. 3 While in
practice no state has executed a pregnant women, this section recog-
27. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 321 (1978); Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reser-
vation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311 (1993) (discussing incon-
sistency between international and U.S. policies on executing offenders aged 18 or under).
28. See Stanford. 492 U.S. at 389 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 144 U.N.T.S.
123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
30. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of Au-
gust 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
31. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
32. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX of the Ninth Interna-
tional Conference of American States (1953), reprinted in I Human Rights: The Inter-American
System (Oceana) pt. 1, ch. 4, at I (Thomas B. Buergenthal & Robert E. Norris eds., 1984).
33. See David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63
MINN. L. REV. 35, 72 n. 210 (1978) (of the 32 states with laws imposing capital punishment, only
16 have legislation staying the execution of a pregnant woman until after the birth of her child).
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nizes that by ratifying the Covenant, the United States has under-
taken an affirmative obligation to ensure that no state ever does.
The execution of pregnant women is prohibited by Article 6(5) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also
prohibited by Article 4(5) of the American Convention on Human
Rights and Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights.
C. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
Section 105 implements international standards prohibiting tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This
prohibition is set forth in Article 7 of the Covenant. It is also found
in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Article
3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, 5 and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment.38 No other country has made a reservation,
declaration, or understanding with respect to Article 7.
International standards in this regard are broader than protec-
tions provided under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, at least as so interpreted by the Supreme Court. For instance,
whereas the Eighth Amendment has been found inapplicable to in-
dividuals awaiting trial and to persons held under color of state law
where the victim has not been taken into custody, 7 the Covenant
contains no such limitation." The Human Rights Committee, which
is charged with interpreting the Covenant, has found the following
to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment: placing a prisoner
in a small cell for twenty-three hours out of the day, with random,
arbitrarily granted exercise periods and random destruction of read-
ing material; repeated solitary confinement; and threats of death
34. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1951).
35. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res.
3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
36. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc A/39/51
(1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (entered into
force June 26, 1987).
37. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
38. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
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and deprivation of medical attention. 9 The current definition of
such standards, however, remains in flux. Although the European
Court of Human Rights, in Soering v. United Kingdom, interpreted
a similar provision of the European Convention on Human Rights to
prohibit lengthy stays on death row,4 the Human Rights Commit-
tee came to a contrary conclusion in Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica."1
Enactment of section 105 of the draft Act will ensure that U.S.
practice will conform with the interpretation afforded Article 7 as it
develops under international law by requiring the courts to consult
recognized authorities of international law in giving content to the
provision.
D. Retroactive Imposition of Lighter Penalties
Section 106 provides for the retroactive imposition of lighter
criminal penalties when the penalty for a particular crime is re-
duced by a legislative act. This result is required by Article 15(1) of
the Covenant. It is also required by Article 9 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. Among the other parties to the Cove-
nant, only Italy and Trinidad and Tobago have submitted reserva-
tions regarding this provision. Under current U.S. law, post-
sentence, retroactive reductions in penalties are permitted but not
required."' In the context of existing U.S. constitutional bars to the
imposition of heavier punishment than that mandated when a crimi-
nal act was committed, there is a ready body of case law identifying
when new legislation changes the severity of a particular criminal
punishment."3
39. See 1991 Human Rights Hearing, supra note 2, at 95-96 (reprinting statement of Amnesty
International USA).
40. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (seT. A) at 439 (1989) (finding that extradition of a West German
national to the United States to face trial in Virginia for capital murder would violate the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights Article 3 prohibition on "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment").
41. Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, UN Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986 and 225/1987, Annex at
1, 10 (Apr. 7, 1989).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (1992) (providing that where a sentencing range is subse-
quently lowered, the court may retroactively reduce the term of imprisonment); UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.10.
43. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937) (reversing the application of a more
onerous mandatory sentence, ex post facto, to a crime committed before the enactment of the
state statute requiring the more onerous sentence).
1993] 1217
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E. Right to Compensation for Unlawful Arrest
Section 107 of the Act would afford, where not otherwise pro-
vided by law, a right to compensation for unlawful arrests and con-
victions resulting from the miscarriage of justice. The provision mir-
rors the language of Articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the Covenant and
would nullify any limiting effect of the second understanding to
U.S. ratification. The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights contain similar requirements. Such com-
pensation in many instances may be available through existing do-
mestic remedies under the common law,44 federal statutes,45 and the
Constitution.4" However, it is not apparent that these remedies give
rise to complete congruence with the requirements of the Covenant.
Section 107 is intended to mandate such congruence, specifically in-
corporating the standards of Articles 9(5) and 14(6) as interpreted
by recognized authorities under international law.
F. Successive Prosecution by Different Sovereigns
Section 108 bars successive prosecutions under federal or state
law except where the subsequent federal prosecution is undertaken
to enforce rights protected under the U.S. Constitution or federal
civil rights statutes. Successive prosecutions are barred under Arti-
cle 14(7) of the Covenant and Article 8(4) of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. Under current U.S. law, successive pros-
ecutions by the federal government and a state or by two states for
the same conduct are not prohibited.47 Subsection (d) of this section
of the draft Act provides an exception for the prosecution by federal
authorities of civil or constitutional rights violations notwithstanding
prior acquittal for the same acts or transactions under state law.
44. For example, a cause of action exists under common law for false arrest. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 11 (5th ed. 1984).
45. The most notable example being the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (1988) (creating a cause of action for unjust conviction by
federal authorities).
46. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (holding that the victim of an unlawful arrest may bring suit against a federal agent for a
constitutional tort).
47. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (holding that successive prosecutions by
two states were not precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (holding same for successive prosecution by federal and state
authorities).
1218 [Vol. 42:1209
ADDING TEETH TO U.S. RATIFICATION
The exception, which would preclude the insulation otherwise pro-
vided under this section for civil rights offenses inadequately prose-
cuted by state authorities, is justified as in furtherance of other pro-
tections provided under the Covenant.
G. Segregation of the Accused and Convicted
Section 109 requires, to the extent practicable, the separate con-
finement of accused and convicted prisoners. Separate confinement
of the accused and the convicted is mandated by Article 10(2)(a) of
the Covenant. It is also required under Article 5 of the American
Convention on Human Rights and by Rules 8(b) and 85(1) of the
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 8
Although the Federal Bail Reform Act already requires such segre-
gation of federal prisoners,49 section 109 would expand the require-
ment to cover all persons imprisoned in the United States.
H. Segregation of Juvenile from Adult Offenders
Finally, section 110 prohibits the confinement of accused and ad-
judicated juvenile offenders in any institution in which the juvenile
would have regular contact with adult prisoners. Articles 10(2)(b)
and 10(3) of the Covenant and Article 5 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights require the segregation of juvenile and adult
prisoners, as do Rules 8(d) and 85(2) of the U.N. Standard Mini-
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The language of section
110 tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. § 5035, which requires the
separation of juvenile offenders from adult prisoners in the federal
system."' The draft provision would extend this requirement to the
states. Although virtually every state now requires the segregation
of juvenile offenders and adult prisoners, enforcement of these laws
by state officials has been erratic."' Section 110 is designed to pro-
vide additional recourse for juvenile offenders who have been unlaw-
fully confined in close quarters with adult prisoners.
48. U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N.
ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. I, at II, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), extended, E.S.C. Res. 2976,
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. I, at 35 (1977).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (i)(2) (1985) (requiring that persons committed to the custody of the
Attorney General for confinement in correctional facilities be separated "to the extent practica-
ble" from persons awaiting or serving sentences or held pending appeal).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 5035.
51. See Kristin H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult
Jails, 66 IND. L.J. 999, 1024-25 (1991).
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III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY FOR ENACTMENT OF THE
CONFORMITY ACT
By its terms, the draft Act would preempt the effectiveness of any
inconsistent law or practice at the state level. Under well-settled
principles of international law, federal authorities are held account-
able for the acts of constituent elements.52 All of the rights guaran-
teed by the draft Act implicate practices of the states, in some cases
exclusively so. The Act's expressly preemptive effect is thus of vital
importance to accomplishment of substantial compliance by the
United States with the requirements of the Covenant.
Although constraints on the states posed by the draft Act touch
upon matters traditionally within the dominant concern of state au-
thorities, it is fully consistent with the constitutional strictures of
our federal system. Congress enjoys two independent sources of au-
thority for imposition of the draft Act: section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article I's so-called Offenses Clause.
A. Congressional Powers Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Section 5 grants Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of" the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 includ-
ing its broad protections against the denial of due process and equal
protection. By the grant of section 5, "in no organ of government,
state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial
power than in Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with
competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees."54
"Correctly viewed, Section 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 Quite apart from the aim of con-
forming U.S. law with that mandated by the Covenant and interna-
tional law, the expansion of constitutional guarantees proposed in
the draft Act constitutes a valid exercise of the section 5 power. The
objectives of the draft Act all implicate rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the legislation, viewed both as a whole
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 321
cmt. b (1987).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
54. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980).
55. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
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and in its particulars, may thus be considered necessary to achieve
full protection of those rights.
Several of the Act's provisions - specifically those that address
compensation for unlawful arrest, successive prosecutions, and sepa-
ration of the convicted from the accused and of juveniles from
adults - squarely implicate due process protections and thus come
within the direct ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment in general
and of section 5 in particular. 6 Equal protection of the laws will be
enhanced by the provisions addressing execution, torture, and retro-
active imposition of lighter penalties insofar as minorities may be
affected disproportionately by such punishments.5 7 Finally, all of the
provisions of the draft Act seek, to a greater or lesser extent, to
prohibit "cruel or unusual punishment" as proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution and as applicable to the states
through the incorporative effect of the Fourteenth. This is most ob-
viously true with respect to the proposed prohibition on the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders and of pregnant women, 58 and to the adop-
tion of Eighth Amendment-like international standards of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
These measures are all amenable to the fact-finding abilities and
particular institutional competence of the Congress. 9 They com-
prise a finely tuned and broadly tailored package that could not be
executed by way of judicial action. 60 The fact that the Supreme
Court has made clear that it would not make similar determinations
56. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (recognizing cause of action for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (noting that successive prosecutions by state and federal
authorities implicate Fifth Amendment due process rights); Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41, 43
(Ist Cir. 1986) (detecting due process mandate for separation of adults and juveniles in some
cases).
57. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (recognizing evidence that capital pun-
ishment and other criminal penalties may disproportionately affect minorities); Jones v. Cupp, 452
F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1971) (noting equal protection concerns respecting retroactive imposi-
tion of lighter penalties).
58. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (considering a challenge under the
Eighth Amendment to the execution of a seventeen-year-old convicted of murder).
59. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966); see also McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
319 (1987) (concluding that legislative bodies are better positioned to consider and act on evi-
dence of disproportionate impact of the death penalty and on resulting equal protection concerns).
60. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court, which




is no bar to contrary congressional action. 61 Because each provision
of the draft Act would further protections mandated by the Four-
teenth Amendment, enactment of the draft Act would represent a
legitimate exercise of Congress's section 5 power.
This legitimacy is significantly bolstered by the draft Act's refer-
ence to standards established under international law. 62 Interna-
tional human rights norms have long been relevant to the delimita-
tion of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. In applying the
prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,
for example, the Supreme Court has been guided by the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."63 In 1988, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,64 the Court looked spe-
cifically to the Covenant, as well as to other international instru-
ments and international state practice, in the course of finding an
Eighth Amendment violation in the execution of a fifteen-year-old
criminal offender.65 The courts have likewise examined international
norms when applying due process protections. In Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez,66 for example, the Supreme Court cited the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in the course of holding a federal
statute which expatriated Americans who refused to serve in the
military to violate due process.67
61. In Morgan, the Supreme Court upheld the invalidation of state literacy requirements pur-
suant to the Voting Acts Rights of 1965, notwithstanding the Court's previous holding in Lassiter
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), that such literacy requirements did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649. In the face of a Supreme Court
increasingly inclined towards restrictive interpretations of constitutional rights, Congress has in
recent years demonstrated a greater willingness to resort to § 5 as the basis for several important,
albeit as yet unperfected, legislative initiatives. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R.
2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (seeking to reverse the Supreme Court's free exercise decision
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); Racial Justice Act, S. 1249, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (to reverse the Supreme Court's holding in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), that imposition of the death penalty does not violate equal protection); Freedom of Choice
Act, S. 25, Version 1, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (to guarantee, through legislation, abortion
rights as defined in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), despite dilution by subsequent decisions);
Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?:
An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1993).
62. See app., infra at 1228-31, §§ 102, 105(c), 107(c).
63. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
64. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
65. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 & n.34; see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369
n.l (1989) (noting that the "practice of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be
relevant" to constitutional norms implicated by capital punishment).
66. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
67. Id. at 161 n.16, 164-66; see also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan.
1980), afl-d, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (looking to the Universal Declaration of Human
[Vol. 42:12091222
ADDING TEETH TO U.S. RATIFICATION
To the extent the courts can look to international norms in defin-
ing constitutional standards, so too may Congress. The legislative
branch is both better equipped to ascertain those international
norms and institutionally capable of deciding which of such norms
are properly incorporated into U.S. law. Thus the very purpose of
the draft Act - to bring the United States into conformity with
international law - demands the sort of special competence upon
which the Fourteenth Amendment, section 5 authority is ultimately
grounded, and section 5 accordingly supplies a legitimate constitu-
tional basis for the draft Act.
B. The Offenses Clause
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that Congress has the power to "define and punish ...Offenses
against the Law of Nations."6 The Offenses Clause was adopted to
prevent individual states from violating international law and to as-
sist the new federal government in presenting the world with one
unified voice in foreign affairs. Congress's power under the Offenses
Clause is broad in scope and has been deferentially addressed by the
courts. Given its express aim of conforming U.S. law to interna-
tional standards, the draft Act provides a classic opportunity for ex-
ercise of Congress's Offenses Clause powers.
During the Confederation period, national leaders feared that re-
peated violations of international law by the states posed great dan-
gers for the Confederacy in its dealings with, and reputation among,
other nations.6 9 Finding the absence of legislative authority to pun-
ish offenses against the law of nations as among the central flaws of
the Articles of Confederation, the Framers placed a high priority on
inclusion of the Offenses Clause in the Constitution.70 To avert these
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights in concluding that the challenged deten-
tion of aliens violated due process protections); Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of Human
Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981); Nadine
Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative
Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 834 (1990).
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
69. See Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary Interna-
tional Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321, 333 (1986); Stewart Jay,
The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 825 (1989).
70. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 69, at 333 n.79 (noting Alexander Hamilton's observation
that "for want of authority [to punish international offenses], the faith of the United States may
be broken, their reputation sullied, and their peace interrupted by the negligence or misconception
of any particular state" (quoting 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
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dangers, on the authority of the Offenses Clause, Congress was em-
powered to supersede state legislation in violation of the law of na-
tions. 71 Although the Founders' fears that state violations of interna-
tional law could draw the nation into war may seem improbable in
the human rights context, the potential for other less dramatic
repercussions is very real.72 Congress's enactment of the draft Inter-
national Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993 would defuse the
possibility of any such international action, thus serving a core pur-
pose of the Offenses Clause power.
Under the original draft version of the Offenses Clause, Congress
could only "punish" offenses against the law of nations; it was not
empowered to "define" them.7 3 At the constitutional convention,
however, the Framers revised the clause to provide Congress with
the necessary discretion to make sense of what Gouverneur Morris
described as the "vague and deficient" standards set by interna-
tional law. 7 ' The Framers thus viewed Congress's authority to "de-
fine" and "punish" offenses against the law of nations as separate
powers. Congress could define offenses without necessarily proscrib-
ing criminal penalties for them. This power to declare "civil" of-
fenses or simply prohibit conduct violating international law pro-
vides Congress with the flexibility to deal with various types of
offenses against international law. While such acts as piracy and
hijacking are natural candidates for criminal sanctions, violations of
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863)); see also THE FED-
ERALIST No. 42, at 272 (James Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976) ("[A]ny indiscreet member
[might] embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations.").
71. See Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution. 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 63 (1988).
72. For example, the international community can and often does impose economic and diplo-
matic sanctions on violators of international human rights law. These sanctions can frequently be
severe, including embargoes and other trade sanctions, government-to-government protests, and
the withdrawal of diplomatic recognition. See Michael J. Glennon, Can the President Do No
Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT. L. 923, 928 (1986). International condemnation of U.S. violations of
standards set by the Covenant is already pronounced, see, e.g., David Weissbrodt, Current Devel-
opment, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 685, 689-91 (1986) (noting public appeals by U.N. Secretary-General
and special rapporteur regarding executions of juvenile offenders in the United States); South
Carolina Executes Killer: Age Stirs Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1986, § I, at 6 (citing interna-
tional condemnation of the execution of a juvenile offender), and such protest could inevitably
assume a more concrete form against the United States as a whole.
73. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 614 (M. Farrand ed.,
1911).
74. See 2 id. This grant of discretionary power to Congress also garnered the support of James
Madison, who found conflicting interpretations of international law too "dishonorable and illegiti-
mate [a] guide" to go undefined by Congress. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 272 (James Madison)
(Bicentennial ed. 1976); Glennon, supra note 69, at 333.
1224 [Vol. 42:1209
1993] ADDING TEETH TO U.S. RATIFICATION 1225
international law by state governments require more sensitive treat-
ment. In this context, simple prohibitions are more appropriate than
criminal penalties but no less consistent with the Offenses Clause
authority.
The Offenses Clause power has not lain dormant. Congress has,
from the earliest days of the Republic up to the present day, repeat-
edly exercised its Offenses Clause powers. 5 None of these statutes
has been so much as questioned, much less struck down, as an inva-
lid exercise of the Offenses Clause power. Indeed, courts have re-
peatedly deferred to Congress's discretionary power to define of-
fenses against the law of nations, and the cases make plain that
Congress may ground offenses against international law on slim
support. 6
But even under the most exacting of definitions, the international
human rights norms enunciated in the draft Act readily satisfy "the
law of nations" threshold of the Offenses Clause. Courts have gener-
ally interpreted the phrase "law of nations" to cover both treaty-
based and customary international law." The international human
75. Statutes founded upon the Offenses Clause include: the Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(a) & (b) (1988) (enacted in 1984 as part of U.S. implementation of the Tokyo, Hague, and
Montreal anti-hijacking conventions, with legislative history expressly relying on the Offenses
Clause by way of constitutional authority); Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988); Sub-
marine Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 21-39 (1988) (regulating and protecting the use of international
telephone cables); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988); Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) (granting federal jurisdiction over alien tort claims
arising from violations of "the law of nations"); Act to Prevent and Punish the Counterfeiting of
Notes, Bonds, and Other Securities of Foreign Governments, 23 Stat. 22 (1884) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 482 (1988)); Congressional Resolution Barring Protests in Front of Embassies, D.C.
Code § 22-1115 (since repealed); 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1988) (criminalizing conduct, such as per-
jury and forgery, constituting a misuse of visas, permits, and other entry documents); Act for the
Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, Ch. IX, §§ 25-28, 1 Stat. 112-19
(1790) (criminalizing affronts to ambassadors and other public ministers and regulating safe-con-
duct and passports) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 541-546 (1988)).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887) (relying solely on the writing
of a single legal scholar in upholding Congress's definition of an offense against the law of na-
tions); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1481-84 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afd in part, rev'd in part, 485
U.S. 312 (1987) (finding valid Congress's exercise of its Offenses Clause power to enact a statute
barring protests in front of a foreign embassy despite tenuous treaty-based support). The broad
power of Congress to define violations of international law contrasts sharply with that of the
courts acting alone. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-710 (1900) (devoting 25 pages
of text to discussion of international law where the Court itself was required to define interna-
tional custom).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820) (finding law of
nations to include "general usage and practice of nations"); The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 298,
307 (1819) (referring to and affirming the "customary and conventional law of nations"); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796) ("The law of nations may be considered of three kinds,
to wit, general, conventional, or customary."); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d
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rights norms set forth in the International Human Rights Conform-
ity Act of 1993 are protected by numerous treaties and international
pronouncements and have arguably come to represent binding cus-
tomary law as well.78 No less than 115 nations have acceded to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and related instruments have
received similar support. This strong international support for the
individual human rights protected in the draft Act, as manifested
both by formal instruments and by custom, far exceeds that re-
quired for the valid exercise of Congress's Offenses Clause powers.
Against the backdrop of the drafting history and the Framers' in-
tent, prior use by Congress, and the extreme judicial deference ac-
corded congressional action pursuant thereto, the Offenses Clause
affords a solid constitutional foundation for the draft Act.79
CONCLUSION
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights demonstrates this country's continuing commitment to the
guarantee of basic human rights. Reservations and conditions at-
tached to U.S. ratification of the Covenant are inconsistent with
that commitment, and it is unfortunate that the United States con-
tinues to find itself unable to harmonize domestic practice with in-
Cir. 1980) (relying on treaties, practice, and legal scholarship).
78. See supra notes 27-52 and accompanying text (specifying alternative treaty-based support
for operative provisions of the draft Act); see also Report of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/21, at 100 (noting the "special status" of
the Covenant, "having been proclaimed and adopted by the General Assembly and having re-
ceived for the most part widespread acknowledgement throughout the international community");
Yoram Dinstein, Right to Life, Physical Integrity and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 114, 136 (observing that certain Covenant safeguards have become
"generally accepted norms of customary international law"); Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Stein-
hardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 70
(1981).
79. Congress's broad powers under the Offenses Clause appear still further enhanced when read
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, which has special significance for the con-
duct of international relations insofar as it draws on the foreign affairs power of the entire federal
government, not merely that of Congress. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160
(1963) ("Congress has broad power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation
for the regulation of foreign affairs."); see also United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887)
("A right secured by the law of nations to a nation, or its people, is one the United States ... are
bound to protect. Consequently, a law which is necessary and proper to afford this protection is
one that congress may enact ...."). Likewise, Congress's powers under the Offenses Clause
cannot be completely divorced from its expansive powers under the Commerce Clause. See id. at
487-88.
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ternational norms through the direct mechanism of the treaty-mak-
ing process. One can hope that with respect to future human rights
conventions both the Senate and the Executive Branch will find the
way to allow the immediate domestic implementation of internation-
ally mandated rights, thus eliminating the need for subsequent legis-
lative fulfillment of such acceptable international obligations.
That, however, is water under the bridge as concerns the Cove-
nant. Through operation of the normal legislative process, the Inter-
national Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993 will eliminate such
disparities between U.S. and international law as will result from
entrenchment of these conditions. Indeed, in assuming the form of
domestic legislation, the draft Act presents an excellent opportunity
to raise national consciousness of our failure fully to comply with
prevailing international standards and to cement a natural and pow-
erful alliance between domestic and international human rights ad-
vocacy groups. Enactment of the bill will mark a significant step
towards more complete recognition of the primacy of international
human rights, and towards the more complete protection of those
rights in both the United States and other nations.
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APPENDIX
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONFORMITY
ACT OF 1993
Section 101. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "International Human Rights Con-
formity Act of 1992."
Section 102. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose
(a) Congress finds that-
(1) the steadfast commitment of the United States to the uni-
versal protection of human rights as a core value of our tradi-
tions, of our laws and Constitution, and of our relations with
other nations is not yet adequately reflected by our present par-
ticipation in international covenants and treaties protecting
these rights;
(2) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
has come to represent, both as a source and reflection of, the
law of nations with respect to certain human rights;
(3) reservations were attached to United States ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with
the understanding that Congress would subsequently consider
changes to United States law through the normal legislative
process in order to more closely conform domestic human rights
law with the law of nations;
(4) the participation of both Houses of Congress in the process
of conforming United States law with international human
rights standards properly reflects the importance that the
United States places on the domestic protection of civil and po-
litical rights;
(5) the elimination of disparities between United States and in-
ternational human rights law as reflected in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights will advance the reputation of the United States
as a longstanding champion of human rights and will reinforce
the protection of these rights in the United States and abroad.
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(b) It is therefore Congress's purpose, through the exercise of its
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations
and to ensure the enforcement of the due process rights embod-
ied in the 14th Amendment to the Unites States Constitution,
to bring United States law in closer conformity with interna-
tional norms for the protection of human rights
(1) by prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders and preg-
nant women;
(2) by making it unlawful to subject individuals to cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment as defined by inter-
national law;
(3) by requiring the retroactive imposition of lighter criminal
penalties;
(4) by providing a federal right to compensation for unlawful
arrests and convictions resulting from the miscarriage of justice;
(5) by prohibiting prosecution of individuals by federal or state
authorities when an individual has already suffered final convic-
tion or been acquitted for the same acts or transaction;
(6) by requiring the segregation of the accused from the con-
victed, and of juvenile from adult offenders.
(c) Congress's aim in enacting the International Human Rights
Conformity Act of 1992 is limited to the elimination of certain
disparities between the protection of civil and political rights
under current United States law and the protection afforded
such rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights. Congress does not purport by this Act to address all
facets of United States law protecting domestic civil and politi-
cal rights. Nor does Congess here intend to address every re-
spect in which United States law does not conform with interna-
tional standards of human rights.
Section 103. Execution of Juvenile Offenders
No individual shall be executed for a crime or crimes committed
while under the age of eighteen.
Section 104. Execution of Pregnant Women
No woman shall be executed while pregnant.
1993] 1229
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Section 105. Torture or Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment
(a) No individual shall be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
(b) The term "torture" shall mean any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as, including but not limited to, obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescense of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.
(c) "Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" shall
be given such content and definition by the courts of the United
States as provided for by recognized authorities under governing
principles of international law, and should depend on the kind, pur-
pose, and severity of the particular treatment.
Section 106. Retroactive Imposition of Lighter Penalties
Where a mandatory criminal penalty for an offense imposed under
either state or federal law is reduced by subsequent legislative act,
the penalty imposed on all individuals previously convicted of and
continuing to suffer confinement for that offense must be reduced in
conformity with the new penalty.
Section 107. Compensation for Unlawful Arrest
(a) To the extent not otherwise provided by law, anyone who has
been the victim of unlawful arrest shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.
(b) When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a crim-
inal offense and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed
or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discov-
ered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of
justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such
conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved
that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or
partially attributable to him.
(c) This section shall be interpreted by the courts of the United
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States consistent with such interpretations accorded Articles 9(5)
and 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights by recognized authorities under governing principles of inter-
national law.
Section 108. Successive Prosecutions
(a) No individual shall be subject to prosecution under state law for
an offense arising from the same acts or transaction for which he
has already been finally acquitted or convicted under federal law.
(b) No individual shall be subject to prosecution under federal law
for an offense arising from the same acts or transaction for which he
has already been finally acquitted or convicted under state law.
(c) No individual shall be subject to prosecution under state law for
an offense arising from the same acts or transaction for which he
has already been finally acquitted or convicted under the law of an-
other state.
(d) Subsection (b) of this Section does not preclude successive pros-
ecution under federal law when the Attorney General of the United
States has determined in writing that such prosecution is necessary
to enforce rights protected under the United States Constitution,
this Act, or any other Federal civil rights statute.
Section 109. Separation of the Convicted from the Accused
To the extent practicable, accused persons shall be confined sepa-
rately from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in
custody pending appeal.
Section 110. Separation of Juvenile and Adult Offenders
Accused and adjudicated juvenile offenders shall not be confined in
any institution in which the juvenile has regular contact with adult
persons convicted of a crime or awaiting trial on criminal charges.
For the purposes of this provision, a juvenile offender is a person
under the age of eighteen who has been charged with or adjudicated
of a violation of a criminal law of the United States or any state or
territory.
Section 111. Separability of Provisions
If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person
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or circumstance is held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the re-
maining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Section 112. Repeal of Conflicting Acts
All acts and parts of acts of the United States in conflict with the
provisions of this Act are repealed; provided that, nothing in this
Act shall be construed to limit rights and remedies provided under
any such acts or parts of acts.
Section 113. Preemption
To the extent inconsistent with any provision of this Act, any law,
regulation, order, ruling, provision, practice or other requirement of
a State of Territory or political subdivision thereof is preempted;
provided that, nothing in this Act shall be construed to limit rights
and remedies provided under any such law, regulation, order, ruling,
provision or other requirement.
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